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Abstract
Neutral landscapes and mutational robustness are believed to be im-
portant enablers of evolvability in biology. We apply these concepts to
software, defining mutational robustness to be the fraction of random mu-
tations to program code that leave a program’s behavior unchanged. Test
cases are used to measure program behavior and mutation operators are
taken from earlier work on genetic programming. Although software is of-
ten viewed as brittle, with small changes leading to catastrophic changes
in behavior, our results show surprising robustness in the face of random
software mutations.
The paper describes empirical studies of the mutational robustness
of 22 programs, including 14 production software projects, the Siemens
benchmarks, and four specially constructed programs. We find that over
30% of random mutations are neutral with respect to their test suite.
The results hold across all classes of programs, for mutations at both the
source code and assembly instruction levels, across various programming
languages, and bear only a limited relation to test suite coverage. We
conclude that mutational robustness is an inherent property of software,
and that neutral variants (i.e., those that pass the test suite) often fulfill
the program’s original purpose or specification.
Based on these results, we conjecture that neutral mutations can be
leveraged as a mechanism for generating software diversity. We demon-
strate this idea by generating a population of neutral program variants
and showing that the variants automatically repair latent bugs. Neutral
landscapes also provide a partial explanation for recent results that use
evolutionary computation to automatically repair software bugs.
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1 Introduction
The ability of biological organisms to maintain functionality across a wide range
of environments and to adapt to new environments is unmatched by engineered
systems. Understanding the intertwined mechanisms and evolutionary drivers
that have led to the robustness and evolvability of biological systems is an
important subfield of evolutionary biology. In this paper we focus on neutral
landscapes and mutational robustness, applying these concepts to software.
Today’s software arose through fifty years of continued use, appropriation,
and refinement by software developers. The tools, design patterns and codes
that we have today are those that have proven useful and were robust to software
developer’s edits, hacks and accidents, and those that survived the economic
pressures of the marketplace. We hypothesize that these evolutionary pressures
have caused software to acquire mutational robustness resembling that of natural
systems. Mutational robustness in biological systems is believed to be intimately
related to the capacity for unsupervised evolution and adaptation. We posit that
software mutational robustness points to the potential for powerful methods of
unsupervised software enhancement and evolution.
Robustness is important in software engineering, especially as it relates to
reliability, availability or dependability. Here we focus on genetic robustness,
defining software mutational robustness in terms of changes to computer code.
In this context, we define a neutral mutation to be a random change applied
to a program representation (source code, abstract syntax tree, assembly, bi-
nary, etc.) such that the mutated program’s behavior remains unchanged on
its regression test suite.1 Thus, software fitness is assessed by the program’s
performance on a set of test cases. In Section 6.1 we discuss the use of test
suites to assess software fitness. In Section 3.1 we present a formal definition of
software mutational robustness as the fraction of mutations to a program which
do not change its correctness as assessed by a set of regression tests.
Software mutational robustness measures the fraction of software mutants
that are neutral. Neutral variants are equivalent to the original program with
respect to the test suite. They may or may not be semantically equivalent
(compute the same function) to the original program, they may or may not
have the same non-functional properties (run-time, memory consumption, etc.),
and they may or may not satisfy the specification (required behavior) of the
original designers. Empirically, we find that the program’s test suite is an
acceptable proxy for the program specification. We find many neutral variants
that are both semantically distinct from the original program and still satisfy
the original program’s specification or intended behavior.
This result can be understood more easily when one considers that there are
an infinite number of ways to encode any algorithm in software. For example,
consider this fragment of a recursive quick-sort implementation:
1This definition is not to be confused with the “equivalent mutants” of mutation testing,
see Section 2.3.1.
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if (right > left) {
// code elided ...
quick(left , r);
quick(l, right );
}
Swapping the order of the last two statements to
quick(l, right );
quick(left , r);
changes the run-time behavior of the program without changing the output,
giving an alternate implementation of the specification. We find that neutral
mutations are prevalent in software and contribute to evolvability, as discussed
in Section 4.4.
Our mutation operators (delete, copy, and swap) are described in detail in
Section 3. They are notable because they do not create new code de novo.
Delete and copy are both plausible analogs of genetic operations on DNA, and
all three are edit operations that are routinely performed by programmers. They
are also related to operators commonly used in the genetic programming com-
munity, although we note that we do not have an explicit terminal set as typical
in genetic programming. In effect, our terminal set corresponds to all of the
statements contained in the program being studied.
We are interested in the extent to which mutational robustness enables soft-
ware evolvability by which we mean the use of automated methods for software
development and maintenance. In particular, there is increasing interest in
automatic program repair, and many of the more promising approaches rely
on unsound program transformations (Section 2.4.1). These may involve both
source-level edits (e.g., [15, 36, 91, 93]) and modification to program state at
run-time (e.g., [66]). Mutational robustness may help explain why program
transformations, such as swapping two statements [93] or clamping an integer
value [66], can produce acceptable program behavior.
The primary contributions of the paper include:
1. The empirical measurement of software mutational robustness in a large
collection of off-the-shelf software, demonstrating that mutational robust-
ness is prevalent. We find largely uniform mutational robustness scores
with an average value of 36.8% and a minimum across all software in-
stances of 21.2%. We evaluate this claim using 22 programs involving
over 150,000 lines of code and 23,151 tests.
2. An application of software mutational robustness to repair unknown soft-
ware defects proactively. As an illustration, we seeded bugs into 11 pro-
grams, generated populations 5,000 of neutral variants using mutation,
and studied the behavior of the variants on the seeded bugs using test
cases withheld during neutral variant generation. In eight of the programs,
the neutral population contained at least one variant that “repaired” the
latent bug, passing the withheld test case.
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3. An alternate interpretation of the software engineering technique known
as mutation testing to include neutral mutations and software robustness.
We discuss the relation between software functionality, software test suites
and specifications, demonstrating the value of neutral mutations, both for
proactively repairing unknown bugs and as a likely enabler of automated
software evolution techniques.
In the remainder of the paper, we review related work in Biology and Soft-
ware Engineering in Section 2. We then describe our software representations
and mutation operators in Section 3. The experimental design and experimental
results are given in Section 4. We present a practical application of software
mutational robustness in Section 5. Finally, we analyze our results and discuss
potential threats to validity and implications in Sections 6 and 7.
2 Background
The previous work most closely related to software mutational robustness in-
cludes work on neutral theories in biology, investigations of the effect of neutral-
ity in fitness landscapes in evolutionary computation and the field of mutation
testing in software engineering. In the following three subsections we highlight
some of the most relevant aspects of these fields.
2.1 Biology
Biological evolution is understood in terms of the interplay between genotype
and phenotype. The genotype is the informational representation that specifies
the organism, and the phenotype is the physical appearance and behavior of
organisms interacting with their environment. There is a corresponding type
of robustness for each of these levels of description: mutational robustness and
environmental robustness respectively [45]. Mutational robustness is the or-
ganism’s ability to maintain phenotypic traits in the face of internal genetic
mutations, and environmental robustness is its ability to maintain functionality
across a wide range of environments [87].
The two types of robustness are closely related. Many of the causes of
mutational robustness are also causes of environmental robustness [52]. It is
thought that the pervasive mutational robustness observed in biological systems
may have arisen as a by-product of evolutionary pressure for environmental
robustness [54]. However mutational robustness has been shown to be beneficial
in its own right, especially in its impact on an organism’s evolvability [12, 63].
Over time, populations of organisms accumulate mutations in their genome.
Of the many mutations that occur in a single individual, only a tiny fraction
spread to fixation in the population. Mutations accumulate at a fairly constant
rate known as the genetic clock [98]. Initially, only those mutations which
increased fitness were thought to become fixed in the population, an idea known
as selectionism [20]. In 1968 Kimura suggested that because populations have
finite size, the majority of accumulated mutations might be effectively neutral,
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with no impact upon fitness [43]. Kimura noted that as a consequence of neutral
mutation, “we must recognize the great importance of random genetic drift
due to finite population number in forming the genetic structure of biological
populations.”
Recent work [18] estimates that roughly 50% of the fixed mutations provide
a selective advantage in Drosophila fruit flies, which have effective population
sizes on the order of 106, while in hominids, with effective populations sizes of
104, a tiny percentage of fix mutations were adaptive. In this study, roughly 16%
of non-equivalent mutations in Drosophila were found to be effectively neutral
compared to roughly 30% of non-equivalent mutations in hominids.
The variants of an organism produced through neutral mutations are called
“neutral neighbors.” Connected sets of neutral neighbors are called “neutral
spaces” [42] and can occupy sizeable regions of an organism’s fitness landscape
[75]. Mutational robustness and the resulting neutral spaces in fitness land-
scapes are believed to contribute to a population’s ability to evolve [32].
Mutational drift through neutral spaces gives populations access to new
phenotypes located along the mutational border of the neutral space. Neutral
spaces thus allow populations to increase diversity and to accumulate new ge-
netic material through drift. This accumulation of genetic material has been
shown to be required for large evolutionary innovations [12, 63, 88, 55].
In effect, mutational robustness of an organism is a metric of its fitness
landscape. A number of metrics of fitness landscapes have been devised in an
attempt to statistically characterize landscapes [29] and to directly measure
those properties of a landscape that encourage evolution [79]. Our proposed
software mutational robustness begins the work of applying such metrics to
real-world software.
2.2 Evolutionary Computation
The role of neutrality in evolutionary computation has been explored in several
specific contexts. In simple GP systems whose fitness landscapes have similari-
ties to those of RNA, neutral mutations have been shown to enhance exploration
in evolutionary searches [6]. Neutrality was shown to be beneficial for evolving
digital circuits, both in retrospective analysis of successful experiments [28], and
in directed experiments using synthetic fitness landscapes designed with vari-
able amounts of neutrality [85]. Some GP methods such as Cartesian genetic
programming [56] have been explicitly designed to leverage neutrality in genetic
search.
Using a population genetics model, varying levels of mutational robustness
have been shown to either inhibit or encourage evolution, depending on pop-
ulation size, mutation rate, and fitness landscape [17]. Some studies (e.g., us-
ing a GA to optimize robot movement [80]) suggest that with certain complex
genotype-phenotype mappings, periods of neutral evolution do not measurably
increase a population’s evolvability. Although none of this prior work studies
neutrality in software per se, it does suggest that success in evolving software
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(e.g., repairing bugs) may be related to neutral landscapes in the space of pro-
gram representations.
2.3 Software Engineering
Three subfields of software engineering, namely mutation testing, n-version pro-
gramming, and program transformation are most relevant to this work.
2.3.1 Mutation Testing
The software engineering community has studied randomly generated program
mutants for over 30 years under the mantle of “Mutation Testing”; however, the
interpretation and use of program mutants has been limited to measuring test
suite adequacy. In their landmark review of mutation testing Jia and Harmon
describe the field as follows [35].
Mutation Testing is a fault-based testing technique which provides
a testing criterion called the “mutation adequacy score.” The mu-
tation adequacy score can be used to measure the effectiveness of a
test set in terms of its ability to detect [mutants] faults.
In mutation testing, non-equivalent mutants are presumed to indicate a fault
(either in the mutant or the original program). Thus, mutants that pass a pro-
gram’s test suite indicate test suite failures and lower the test suite’s “mutation
adequacy score.” Mutation testing recognizes the existence of “equivalent mu-
tants” which are semantically identical to the original program (cf. the Equiva-
lent Mutant Problem [11]) and viewed as problematic for the mutation testing
paradigm. The mutation testing literature, however, does not recognize the
possibility of valid neutral mutants; i.e., mutants that are semantically distinct
from the original program but still satisfy the original program’s specification
(and its test suite).
Figure 1 shows the syntactic space surrounding a program. This is similar
to a fitness landscape; each point in the space represents a syntactically dis-
tinct program, and each program is associated with a semantic interpretation
although that is not shown in the figure. Randomly mutating a program’s syn-
tactic representation can have several possible semantic effects, which are shown
in the figure.
Our results are based on the following insight: for every specification there
exists multiple non-equivalent correct implementations. This emphasizes a dif-
ferent view of software than is implicit in the mutation testing technique, namely,
that for every program specification all correct implementations are semantically
equivalent.
To see how this follows from mutation testing, assume that ∃ programs a and
b s.t. a is not equivalent to b (a 6 (−1cm : 1.5cm)circle(1cm)b) and both a and
b satisfy specification S. Without loss of generality let a be the original program
and b be a mutant of a. Let T be a test suite of S. According to Offut [61] there
are two possibilities when T is applied to b. Either “the mutant is killable, but
6
Program Syntactic Space
Specification
(acceptable)
Original Program
Test Suite
0
2
1
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3
5
Neutral Mutants
Equivalent Mutant
Killed Mutants
Figure 1: Syntactic Space of a Program. The set of programs satisfying the program
specification are shaded blue (left), the set of programs passing the program’s test suite
are shaded red (right), and the set of equivalent programs are shown in green (center).
The relative size of these spaces and of their intersection is unknown. Three classes
of mutants are shown and labeled. This work leverages the existence of valid neutral
mutants such as 2 which lie in the intersection of the specification and the test suite.
the test cases is insufficient” or “the mutant is functionally equivalent.” The
former case is impossible because b is assumed to be a correct implementation
of S and thus should not be killed by any test suite of S. The later case is
impossible because we assume a 6 (−1cm : 1.5cm)circle(1cm)b. By contraction,
∀ a and b satisfying the same specification S, a(−1cm : 1.5cm)circle(1cm)b or
∀ specification S ∃!a s.t. a satisfies S.
Taking this perspective, by requiring test suites to kill all non-equivalent neu-
tral mutants, mutation testing could lead to test suites that are more restrictive
than the specification. To illustrate this point, consider the specification and
programs in Figure 2. Programs a and b both satisfy the specification S, yet
they are not equivalent (notably on many four element arrays). Any test suite
for S which kills one of these implementations will be overly restrictive.
In the following sections, we study non-equivalent neutral mutants and inves-
tigate their relative frequency in our benchmark programs. Our study extends
work on mutation testing by emphasizing non-equivalent neutral mutations (cf.
neutral mutants 2 and 3 in Figure 1 which behave identically to the original
program with respect to a given test suite), discussing how they can be lever-
aged, and by providing a biological interpretation for the phenomenon of neutral
mutations.
7
/*
* Spec (S):
* Pre : parameter P is an array of three integer elements
* Post: returns the smallest of the three input elements
*/
int a(int p[]) {
if (p[0] <= p[1] && p[0] <= p[2]) return p[0];
if (p[1] <= p[2] && p[1] <= p[0]) return p[1];
else return p[2];
}
int b(int p[]) {
sort(p, "ascending ");
return p[0];
}
Figure 2: Specification S and two correct, non-equivalent implementations.
2.4 N-Version Programming
There has been considerable research on the use of automated diversity in se-
curity, for example, the special issue of IEEE Computer Security devoted to IT
Monocultures [33]. Common mechanisms for introducing diversity include Ad-
dress Space Randomization [9, 22] and Instruction Set Randomization [8, 40],
among many others. In these applications, diversity is introduced to reduce the
risk of widely replicated attacks, by forcing the attacker to redesign the attack
each time it is applied [96]. Our proposed use of diversity, outlined in Section 5,
is closer in spirit to n-variant systems [14], where multiple variants of a program
are run in parallel, giving each variant identical inputs and checking that they
all behave similarly before forwarding the output to the user.
Our proposed application also resembles n-version programming [53] where
multiple independent, or quasi-independent, manually written implementations
of critical programs reduce the risk of implementation errors going undetected.
Our approach differs from n-version programming: Instead of relying on teams
of human programmers to generate full implementations independently, we use
lightweight mutation operators to automatically generate variants that are se-
mantically similar to the original. This addresses the cost issue identified in
earlier studies [46] and potentially addresses the assumption that independent
teams of humans are likely to generate programs that will fail independently;
studies suggest that this assumption does not hold in practice [48]. Because
we generate variants automatically, there is a better chance of achieving inde-
pendence among the variations, either with the mutation operators we describe
here or with others to be developed in the future.
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2.4.1 Unsound Program Transformation
Traditionally, automated program transformation techniques (e.g., compiler op-
timizations) refrain from altering the semantics (or behavior) of the original pro-
gram. Such program transformations are “sound” because they are guaranteed
to preserve program semantics. Recent work has experimented with “unsound”
program transformations, which do not necessarily preserve the exact semantics
of the original program.
Self-healing systems [25] acknowledge that proactive developer efforts at pro-
viding fault tolerance and reliability are often insufficient, suggesting instead the
idea of reactive methods of runtime protection. For example, the Assure sys-
tem [77] adds rescue points to software which catch otherwise fatal errors, and
handle them by re-purposing error handling code already present in the appli-
cation. Similarly, failure oblivious computing [68], handles common memory
errors, such as out-of-bounds reads and writes, by simply ignoring them or au-
tomatically re-mapping invalid memory addresses to arbitrary valid memory
address, allowing the program to continue execution. Such trade-offs of cor-
rectness for robustness are desirable for applications such as web servers where
availability is paramount.
Loop perforation [57] is a run-time method that sacrifices exact program
accuracy in return for reduced running time or energy consumption. Loop
perforation eliminates some of the computation specified in the original program
by dropping some iterations of selected program loops.
Another important class of unsound program transformations are automated
repair techniques. These techniques share a common approach: defining a no-
tion of correct and incorrect program behavior (e.g., from test cases [93, 66],
implicit specifications [36], or explicit specifications [91]); generating a set of
candidate repair transformations (e.g., at random [93], by constraint solving, or
from an established set [36, 66]), and validating the candidates produced by the
transformations until a suitable repair is found.
Evolutionary methods have been widely used in this work, both to repair
bugs seeded into constructed programs using a subsets of the Java programming
language [5] and to repair real programs written in C [93, 51], including a
systematic study of over 100 bugs mined from open-source software repositories
[50]. Recent work emphasizes evolving software patches directly, rather than
complete program representations [2, 50], evolving repairs at the assembly and
binary code levels [74, 73], and evolving the Java Byte code compiled from
extant programs using specialized mutation operators including a technique of
compatible crossover [64, 65]. Finally, Wilkerson used GP to co-evolve C++
applications in competition with sets of test cases [95].
3 Technical Approach
In this section, we define software mutational robustness, describe the program
representations used in our experiments, and for each representation specify the
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representation-specific mutation operations.
3.1 Software Mutational Robustness
We formalize software mutational robustness with respect to a software program
P (a member of the set of all software programs P), a set of mutation operators
M (where each m ∈ M is a function mapping P → P), and a test suite T : P →
{true, false}. A program P is said to pass the test suite iff T (P ) = true.
Given a program P , a set of mutation operators M , and a test suite T
such that T (P ) = true, we define the software mutational robustness, written
MutRB(P, T,M), to be the fraction of all direct mutants P ′ = m(P ), ∀m ∈ M
which both compile and pass T :
MutRB(P, T,M) =
|{P ′ | m ∈M. P ′ = m(P ) ∧ T (P ′) = true}|
|{P ′ | m ∈ M. P ′ = m(P )}|
Based on this definition, software mutational robustness depends on three
parameters, P , T andM . Perhaps surprisingly, the empirical results of Section 4
show that software robustness does not depend strongly on P or T for human-
constructed software systems. Our mutation operators M , described below,
are adapted from genetic programming and are simple and natural analogs of
biological mutation. We believe that they are also general and appropriate to
software. For example, earlier work has shown that the set M , together with
crossover, is sufficiently strong to generate successful repairs for a wide variety
of defects in a wide variety of software [93, 51, 50]. Additionally, they reflect
common human edit operations.
3.2 Representation and Operators
We consider two levels of program representation: abstract syntax trees (AST)
based on high-level program source code, and low-level assembly code (ASM).
We use the Cil toolkit [58] to parse and manipulate ASTs of C source code. Cil
simplifies some C constructs to facilitate manipulation by computational tools
and supports source to source translations such as our mutation operations. The
ASM representation is the linear sequence of instructions taken directly from
the compiled .s assembly code file produced by standard compilation (i.e., “gcc
-O2 -S”) on a 64-bit Intel platform, which is split on line breaks [74] , but with
directives and other pseudo-operations protected from mutation. Our choice
of one tree-based and one linear representation increases our confidence that
the results do not depend on such representation details. For example, our
AST representation is at the statement level. That is, each node in the AST
corresponds to a legal statement in C. This relatively coarse representation
level provides a distinct contrast to the fine-grained ASM representation, where
approximately three assembly statements represent each C statement.
Given a source code or assembly language program, we consider three simple
language-independent mutation operators: copy, delete and swap. Copy dupli-
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→(a) Copy AST
→
(b) Delete AST
→
(c) Swap AST
movq 8(%rdx), %rdi
xorl %eax, %eax
movq -80(%rbp), %rdx
addl $1, %r14d
call atoi
movq -80(%rbp), %rdx
movl %eax, (%r15)
addq $4, %r15
→
movq 8(%rdx), %rdi
xorl %eax, %eax
movq -80(%rbp), %rdx
addl $1, %r14d
call atoi
movq %rdx, -80(%rbp)
movq -80(%rbp), %rdx
movl %eax, (%r15)
addq $4, %r15
(d) Copy ASM
movq 8(%rdx), %rdi
xorl %eax, %eax
movq %rdx, -80(%rbp)
addl $1, %r14d
call atoi
movq -80(%rbp), %rdx
movl %eax, (%r15)
addq $4, %r15
→
movq 8(%rdx), %rdi
xorl %eax, %eax
addl $1, %r14d
call atoi
movq %rdx, -80(%rbp)
movl %eax, (%r15)
addq $4, %r15
(e) Delete ASM
movq 8(%rdx), %rdi
xorl %eax, %eax
movq %rdx, -80(%rbp)
addl $1, %r14d
call atoi
movq -80(%rbp), %rdx
movl %eax, (%r15)
addq $4, %r15
→
movq 8(%rdx), %rdi
xorl %eax, %eax
movq -80(%rbp), %rdx
addl $1, %r14d
call atoi
movq %rdx, -80(%rbp)
movl %eax, (%r15)
addq $4, %r15
(f) Swap ASM
Figure 3: Mutation operators: Copy, Delete, Swap.
cates an AST statement-level subtree or assembly instruction and inserts it at a
random position in the AST or immediately after a randomly chosen instruction.
Delete removes a randomly chosen statement-level AST subtree or assembly in-
struction. Swap exchanges two randomly chosen statement-level AST subtrees
or assembly instructions. Figure 3 illustrates these operators. Because AST
mutations manipulate subtrees, a large amount of code might be inserted or
deleted by a single mutation, depending on how high in the tree the mutation
is applied. In the experiments, mutations modify only AST statements or ASM
instructions that are actually visited by the test suite. This restriction is sim-
ilar to mutating only those parts of genome that are known to be involved in
the phenotype being assayed. Mutations to untested statements would likely
be neutral under our metric, unfairly biasing the results towards overly high
estimates of mutational robustness.
4 Experimental Results
We report results for five experiments on the mutational robustness of programs
in both representations (AST and ASM). Throughout this section we remain
conscious of the threat that our results may measure the poor quality of program
test suites instead of the intrinsic mutational robustness of software. Much of
our experimental design addresses this particular concern.
We investigate: (1) the level of mutational robustness of several computer
programs (we specifically select benchmark programs with the highest quality
test suites available); (2) the extent to which mutational robustness depends
on or can be explained by test suite quality; (3) a taxonomy of neutral muta-
tions (indicating which mutations would no longer remain neutral under perfect
testing), (4) the effect of cumulative neutral mutations mutations in a simple
program, and (5) generality of mutational robustness across multiple program-
ming languages and paradigms.
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4.1 Benchmark Programs
We selected 22 programs for our experiments (Table 1). Fourteen are off-the-
shelf programs selected to measure mutational robustness in real-world software.
Four are taken from the Siemens Software-artifact Infrastructure Repository,
created by Siemens Research [31] and later modified by Rothermel and Harold
[70] until each “executable statement, edge, and definition-use pair in the base
program or its control flow graph was exercised by at least 30 tests.” The
space test suite, which was generated by Vokolos [86] and later enhanced by
Graves [27], which covers every edge in the control flow graph with at least 30
tests. These programs are included for comparability to previous research and
to study the robustness of programs with extremely high-quality test suites. We
include four simple sorting algorithms taken from http://rosettacode.org to
demonstrate the robustness of programs with full statement, branch-level and
assembly instruction test coverage.
Each program has an associated test suite. The tests either came with the
program as part of its established regression test (e.g., Siemens, potion, redis,
jansson) or were constructed manually (e.g., sorting algorithms, webservers).
A number of our benchmarks implement invertible transformations (e.g., com-
pression, encryption, serialization, image manipulation), which form an implicit
formal specification and permit simple testing [90]. The three invertible pro-
grams (bzip, ccrypt and oggenc) are thus each evaluated on two independently
constructed test suites. For lighttpd and imagemagick, we restricted muta-
tions to mod fastcgi.c and convert.c respectively, demonstrating application
to modules as well as to whole systems.
4.2 Software Mutational Robustness
We first demonstrate that a variety of software programs exhibit significant
mutational robustness under the mutation operators described in Section 3. In
this experiment, we measure the percentage of random mutations to code visited
by at least one test case which leave the program’s behavior unchanged on all
of its test cases. In every case, the initial program passes all of its test cases.
For each mutation operator we generate program variations making at least 200
copies of the original program and then applying a single random mutation to
each copy. We refer to these as first-order, mutations. We then run the mutated
program on its test suite and count it as neutral if it passes all of its tests.
Table 1 shows the results of this experiment on the benchmark programs.
We wish to rule out trivial mutations, such as the insertion of dead code (e.g.,
statements that appear after a return) or the transposition of independent lines,
that are visible in the source code but would produce equivalent assembly code.
Since program equivalence is undecidable [11], we approximate this by com-
piling the AST using “gcc -O2 -S,” which includes dead code elimination, SSA
form, and instruction scheduling. Multiple source code variants that produce
the same optimized assembly code (modulo label names and other directives)
are counted only once in Table 1. Similarly, any two ASM-level mutations which
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Program Lines of Code Test Suite Mut. Robustness
ASM C # Tests % Stmt. AST ASM
Sorting Algorithms
bubble-sort 184 34 10 100 27.3 25.7
insertion-sort 170 29 10 100 29.4 26.0
merge-sort 233 38 10 100 29.8 21.2
quick-sort 219 38 10 100 28.9 25.5
Siemens [31]†
printtokens 2419 536 4130 81.7 21.2 25.8
schedule 922 412 2650 94.4 34.4 29.1
space 18098 9126 13494 91.1 37.7 32.1
tcas 544 173 1608 96.2 33.5 25.9
Systems Programs
bzip2 1.0.2 18756 7000 6 35.9 33.0 26.1
— (alt. test suite) 22 71.0 46.4 23.6
ccrypt 1.2 15261 4249 6 29.5 33.0 69.7
— (alt. test suite) 16 40.4 34.6 69.7
grep 28776 10929 119 24.9 50.0 36.7
imagemagick 6.5.2 6128 147 145 0.8 33.3 66.3
jansson 1.3 6830 2975 30 28.8 33.3 28.0
leukocyte 40226 7970 5 45.4 33.3 39.9
lighttpd 1.4.15 34165 3829 11 40.1 61.5 56.9
nullhttpd 0.5.0 5951 5575 6 64.5 41.5 37.8
oggenc 1.0.1 299959 59094 10 38.4 33.4 22.1
— (alt. test suite) 40 58.8 40.5 72.3
potion 40b5f03 80406 15033 204 48.4 33.3 48.9
redis 1.3.4 44802 17203 234 9.2 33.3 34.0
sed 17026 8059 360 42.0 33.0 25.6
tiff 3.8.2 22458 1732 10 15.4 33.3 90.4
vyquon 335426d 20567 4390 5 50.6 33.3 69.0
total or average 664100 158571 23151 40.9 33.9 ±10 39.6 ±22
Table 1: Mutational robustness of benchmark programs. “Lines of Code” columns
report the size of the program in terms of lines of C source code and lines of com-
piled assembly code. The “Test Suite” columns show the size of the test suite both in
terms of number of test cases and the percentage of all AST level statements in the
program that are exercised by the test suite. The “Mut. Robustness” columns report
the percentage of all first-order mutations that were neutral. The ± values in the
bottom row indicate one standard deviation. For each program, at both the AST and
ASM level we generated at least 200 unique variants using each of the three mutation
operations (copy, delete and swap). Mutation operations were applied at locations
chosen randomly from all those visited by the test cases. For three programs (bzip,
ccrypt and oggenc) we also evaluated on three independent alternate test suites.
† Although the Siemens benchmark suite claims complete branch and statement cover-
age, we find less than 100% statement coverage. This is due to our use of finer-grained
Cil statements in calculating coverage. See Section 3.2 for discussion of the Cil program
representation. 13
produce the same executable are counted only once.
Although the results vary by program (e.g., grep is more robust than printtokens),
the results show a remarkably high level of mutational robustness: Across all
programs, operators, and representations (source or assembly) 36.8% of vari-
ants continue to pass all test cases with no systematic difference between the
AST and ASM representation. In the next two subsections we ask to what
extent these results arise from inadequate test suites (4.3) or from semantically
equivalent mutations (4.4).
4.3 Does Mutational Robustness Depend on Test Suite
Quality?
The results in Table 1 are striking, but they could potentially be entirely the
result of inadequate test suites. In Figure 4 we plot the data from Table 1,
showing the mutational robustness of software grouped by the quality of the
software test suite. We consider both the quantitative metrics of code coverage
of these test suites, as well as qualitative differences between the program test
suites by panel.
Qualitatively the program classes in the three panels of Figure 4 have very
different test suites.
Sorting program suites all share a single test suite. This test suite leverages the
simplicity of sorting programs to provide complete code coverage (at both
the statement and assembly instruction levels) with only 10 test cases.
Siemens program suites taken from the testing community where they have
been developed by multiple parties across multiple publications [31, 70]
until each “executable statement, edge, and definition-use pair in the base
program or its control flow graph was exercised by at least 30 tests.”
Systems program suites are taken directly from real world software develop-
ment projects. These test suites reflect the great range of test suites used
in practice.
Quantitatively, the sorting programs in Panel 4a have 100% code coverage
and the Siemens benchmark programs in Panel 4b have close to 100% code
coverage. By contrast the Systems programs in Panel 4c have 37.63 ± 19.34
coverage. Despite this wide range of coverage, the average mutational robust-
ness varies relatively little between Panels at 26.7% (Panel 4a), 29.8% (Panel
4b) and 43.7% (Panel 4c) respectively, and the minimum mutational robust-
ness measurements for each Panel are even closer at 21.2%, 21.2% and 22.1%
respectively.
The lack of correlation between code coverage and mutational robustness is
not surprising, both because we explicitly limit the mutation operators to code
that is visited by test suites, and because statement coverage is known to be an
insufficient metric of test suite quality [30].
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Figure 4: Mutational robustness shown by quality of test suite. The simple
sorting programs in 4a have complete code and ASM instruction coverage with few
carefully constructed test cases. The Siemens programs in 4b have complete branch
and def-use pair coverage and thousands of test cases for relatively small programs.
The Systems programs in 4c have test suites that vary greatly in quality.
15
# Functional Category Frequency/35
1 Different whitespace in output 12
2 Inconsequential change of internal variables 10
3 Extra or redundant computation 6
4 Equivalent or redundant conditional guard 3
5 Switched to non-explicit return 2
6 Changed code is unreachable 1
7 Removed optimization 1
Table 2: Taxonomy of 35 neutral first order AST variations of bubble sort.
Categorized by manual review. “Different whitespace in output” describes variants
whose output differs from the original program only in whitespace characters which are
not detected by the test suite. “Inconsequential change of internal variables” describes
variants whose mutations change the behavior of the program while executing but do
not change the tested output of the program, e.g., mutations which change the values
of variables in memory which do not later affect program output or variants which
change the ordering of non-interacting instructions.
In fact, the lack of correlation between mutational robustness and test suite
quality is not true in either limit. At one extreme, even high-quality test suites
(such as the Siemens benchmarks, which were explicitly designed to test all
execution paths) and test suites with full statement, branch and assembly in-
struction coverage have over 20% mutational robustness. At the other extreme,
a minimal test suite that we designed for bubble sort, which does not check
program output but requires only successful compilation and execution without
crash, has only 84.8% mutational robustness.
These results show that, in practice, for both real programs and compre-
hensively tested ones, mutational robustness is not fully explained by test suite
quality or inadequacy.
4.4 Taxonomy of Neutral Variants
To provide insight into our results, we chose bubble sort as an example of an
easy-to-understand and easy-to-test program. We then studied the effect of 35
first-order neutral mutations on bubble sort at the AST level, developing a tax-
onomy of the neutral mutations. After manual review, all 35 neutral variations
were confirmed to be valid implementations of the sorting specification. We next
categorized them with respect to their operational differences from the original.
The results are shown in Table 2.
These categories have different effects on program execution. Only categories
1 and 5 affect the externally observable behavior of the program by changing
output and return values in ways not specified by the program specification.
Categories 2, 3, 4 and 7 may affect the running time of the program. Category
2 includes the removal of unnecessary variable assignments, re-ordering non-
interacting instructions and changing state which is later overwritten or never
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again read. Many changes, such as types 2, 3 and 4, produce programs that will
likely be more robust to further manipulation by inserting redundant (occasion-
ally diverse) control flow guards (i.e., conditionals that control if statements)
and variable assignments. Across most of these categories we find alternative
implementations that are not semantically equivalent to the original but which
conform to the program specification.
Of these classes of neutral programs, only classes 4, 5 and 6 could possibly
have no impact on runtime behavior and could possibly be equivalent. Under the
mutation testing paradigm, tests would be constructed to “kill” the remaining
29 of 35 neutral mutants. Given the sorting specification used (namely to print
whitespace separated integer inputs in sorted order to STDOUT separated by
whitespace), none of these classes of neutral mutations could be viewed as faulty
implementations. Consequently, any such extra tests constructed to tell them
apart (e.g., for mutation testing) would over-specify the program specification.
Rather than improving the test suite quality, such over-constrained tests would
potentially judge future correct implementations as faulty.
4.5 Cumulative Robustness
The previous experiments measured the percentage of first-order mutations that
are neutral. This subsection explores the effects of accumulating cumulative
neutral mutations in a small assembly program. We begin with a working
assembly code implementation of insertion sort. We apply random mutations
using the ASM representation and mutation operations defined in Section 3.2.
After each mutation, the resulting variant is retained if neutral, and discarded
otherwise. The process continues until we have collected 100 neutral variants.
The mean program length and mutational robustness of the individuals in this
population are shown as the leftmost red and blue points respectively in Figure
5a. From these 100 neutral variants, we then generate a population of 100 second
order neutral variants. This is accomplished by looping through the population
of first-order mutants, randomly mutating each individual once retaining the
result if it is neutral and discarding it otherwise. Once 100 neutral second-order
variants have been accumulated, the procedure is iterated to produce higher-
order neutral variants. This process produces neutral populations separated
from the original program by successively more neutral mutations. Figure 5
shows the results of this process up to 250 steps producing a final population
of 100 neutral variants, each of which is 250 neutral mutations away from the
original program.
The results show that under this procedure mutational robustness increases
with the mutational distance away from the original program. This is not sur-
prising given that at each step mutationally robust variants are more likely
to produce neutral mutants which will be included in the subsequent popula-
tion. We conjecture that this result corresponds to the population drifting away
from the perimeter of the program’s neutral space. Similar behavior has been
described for biological systems, where populations in a constant environment
experience a weak evolutionary pressure for increased mutational robustness [87,
17
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Figure 5: Random walk in neutral landscape of ASM variations of Insertion
Sort. A series of populations of 100 neutral variants from 1 to 250 edits away from
the original program. At each step on the X-axis, the mean number of lines of code
and mutational robustness of the members of the population are shown. In Panel 5a
the size of neutral variants is allowed to vary, while Panel 5b allows only variants that
are less than or equal to the length of the original program (in ASM LOC). On the 32-
bit machine used for this experiment insertion-sort compiles to 175 assembly LOC.
Both the average size and the mutational robustness of mutant variants are shown on
the Y-axis, the X-axis shows the cumulative number of mutation operators applied.
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C C++ Haskell OCaml Avg. Std.Dev.
bubble 25.7 28.2 27.6 16.7 24.6 5.3
insertion 26.0 42.0 35.6 23.7 31.8 8.5
merge 21.2 46.0 24.9 22.7 28.7 11.6
quick 25.5 42.0 26.3 11.4 26.3 12.5
Avg. 24.6 39.5 28.6 18.6 27.9
Std.Dev. 2.3 7.8 4.8 5.7 3.1
Table 3: Mutational robustness of sorting algorithms at the assembly instruction level
with 100% test suite coverage, for different algorithms and source language.
Ch. 16].
The average size of the program also increases with mutational distance
from the original program (Figure 5a), suggesting that the program might be
achieving robustness by adding “bloat” in the form of useless instructions. To
control for bloat, Figure 5b shows the results of an experiment in which only
individuals that are the same size or smaller than (measured in number of as-
sembly instructions) the original program are counted as neutral. With this
additional criterion, mutational robustness continues to increase but the pro-
gram size periodically dips and rebounds, never exceeding the size of the original
program. The dips are likely consolidation events, where additional instructions
are discovered that can be eliminated.
This result shows that not only are there large neutral spaces surrounding
any given program implementation (in this instance, permitting neutral vari-
ants as far as 250 edits removed from a well-tested < 200 LOC program), but
they are easily traversable through iterative mutation. Figure 5b shows a small
increase in mutational robustness even when controlling for bloat. Further ex-
perimentation will determine if these results generalize to multiple programs.
4.6 Multiple Languages
The source language and compilation process impose important regularities on
the assembly representations of programs. In this section we investigate how
mutational robustness varies across assembly code derived from different lan-
guages. We evaluated the mutational robustness of sorting algorithms com-
piled from five languages that span three programming paradigms (imperative,
object-oriented, and functional). We focused on sorting algorithms because they
are small and sufficiently well-understood to test comprehensively: Test suites
were hand-crafted to cover all executable assembly instructions, branches, and
corner cases.
The results shown in Table 3 demonstrate that mutational robustness is
found across multiple programming languages and paradigms. It is striking
that even for a small, comprehensively tested sorting program, on average 28%
of the first-order mutations did not change the program’s functionality.
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This experiment addresses the question of whether our results depend on id-
iosyncrasies of a particular language implementation or programming paradigm,
and they support the claim that mutational robustness occurs at a significant
rate in a wide variety of software.
5 Application of Mutational Robustness to
Proactive Bug Repair
The previous sections demonstrated the prevalence of mutational robustness in
software, independent of language, algorithm, or test suite coverage. Section
4.5 suggests that multiple mutations can be accumulated in the same program
without loss of functionality. This section provides one example of how we might
leverage software mutational robustness in a practical application proactively
repairing unknown bugs that are not covered by a program’s test suite.
We generate a population of multiple variations of a program, which contain
nontrivial changes to the algorithm or implementation but remain within the
program’s neutral space. Although these variants are neutral to the original
program with respect to the existing test suite, they may not be neutral to the
original if the test suite were later enhanced (e.g., by including tests for as yet
unknown bugs). We find that some of these program variations are immune
to latent bugs in the original program, and they can be used to automatically
pinpoint repairs when new bugs arise.
The term artificial diversity describes a wide variety of techniques for auto-
matically randomizing non-functional properties of programs with the goal of
disrupting widely replicated attacks. Many methods have been proposed, in-
cluding stack frame layouts, instruction set numberings, or address space layouts
[22, 26, 34]. Although the idea of diversifying certain aspects of a program’s
implementation has been previously proposed [7], neutral mutations provide
a much more general and practical approach. We extend earlier work in this
area by generating program variants that are distinct algorithmically but neu-
tral with respect to the test suite. These distinct variants could be used in an
n-variant system [14], in which a diverse population of programs is run simul-
taneously on the same inputs. When the neutral variants contain algorithmic
or implementation changes (rather than simple remappings, as in address space
layout randomization or instruction set randomization), the approach is known
as implementation diversity [13]. Such a system could be used to flag poten-
tial bugs when there are discrepancies in observed behavior, and may be more
robust to bugs which only affect subsets of the population.
This use of mutational robustness is analogous to software mutation testing,
with the critical differences that (1) neutral mutants are retained rather than
manually examined; (2) the test suite is not augmented to kill all mutants;
and (3) the set of mutation operators considered is different. The commercial
practice of mutation testing has been limited by the significant effort required
to analyze mutants that pass the test suite. Such mutants must be manually
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classified, either as fully equivalent to the original program or non-equivalent,
and the latter further classified as buggy or as superior to the original program
(cf. human oracle problem [94]).
Our proposed alternative to the traditional mutation testing practice amor-
tizes these labor intensive steps by retaining a population of all such neutral
variants. When a bug is encountered in the original program, it will be detected
if some members of the population behave anomalously with respect to the
result of the population, and the non-failing variations need only then be ana-
lyzed to suggest a repair. This approach of deferring analysis until a potentially
beneficial variation is found may be more feasible than traditional mutation
testing, because it does not require exhaustive manual review of large numbers
of program variants.
5.1 Repairing Bugs
We first demonstrate that it is possible to construct variants in the neutral fitness
landscape that can repair unknown bugs while retaining required functionality.
To do this, we seeded each of the programs in Table 4 with five random defects
following an established defect distribution [24, p.5] and fault taxonomy [47]
(e.g., “missing conditional clause,” “extra statement,” “constant should have
been variable,” “wrong parameter”). The defects were seeded in advance and
without regard to the mutation operators. For each defect we produced a held-
out test to verify its presence or absence.
For each program, we generated 5,000 first-order neutral variants using the
mutation operators defined in Section 3.2. We then noted which of these passed
any of the five held-out test cases for the seeded bugs. In practice, 5,000 neutral
variants proved sufficient to generate at least one bug-repairing variant for most
programs, and if such a variant was generated at all, it was within the first 5,000
neutral variants. We tested this by searching up to 20,000 variants, which did
not improve performance. Only variants that passed the original test suite were
retained; the mutation process did not have access to the held-out test cases for
the seeded bugs.
Table 4 shows the results. We say that a variant repairs an unknown bug
if it passed all original test cases and the held-out test case associated with
that bug. We found repairs which exactly revert the original bug as well as
compensatory mutations which do not touch the bug itself but repair or avoid
the bug by changing other parts of the program. Specifically, we found that
3% of the proactive repairs changed the same line of code in which the original
bug was seeded and 12% of repairs affect code within 5 lines of the seeded bug.
The remaining 88% of repairs could be considered compensatory in that they
do not affect the bug directly but rather change other portions of the program
so that the bug is not expressed. In nature compensatory mutations are much
more common than mutations which directly repair a given fault [67].
These proactive repairs can be used to pinpoint the bug, because the diff
between them and the original program locates either the bug itself or relevant
portions of the program code. Previous work demonstrated that software en-
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Program Fraction of Bugs Fixed Bug Fixes
bzip 2/5 63
imagemagick 2/5 8
jansson 2/5 40
leukocyte 1/5 1
lighttpd 1/5 73
nullhttpd 1/5 7
oggenc 0/5 0
potion 2/5 14
redis 0/5 0
tiff 0/5 0
vyquon 1/5 1
average 1.0/5 18.8
Table 4: Bugs proactively repaired by neutral variants. Five unique bugs were
seeded in each subject program according to a defect distribution taken from the
Firefox open source project. Five thousand neutral variants were created for each
program through AST level mutation, without regard to the seeded bugs. Each variant
passed all visible tests. The “Unique Bugs Fixed” column counts the number of seeded
bugs fixed by at least one variant. The “Bug Fixes” column counts the number of
variants that fixed at least one bug.
gineers take less time to address defect reports that are accompanied by such
machine-generated patch-like information [92], which provides evidence that
these proactive repairs would be useful in practice.
We observe some common trends when examining Table 4. The bugs re-
paired most easily were those that naturally mirror the mutation strategies
employed by our technique. For example, we found multiple examples of the
repairs that deleted problematic statements or clauses, corrected an incorrect
value for a constant, changed a relational operator (for instance ≤ to <), in-
serted clauses or statements to test for extra conditions, changed a parameter
value in a function call, etc. However, there was significant overlap between the
types of bugs that were proactively repaired and those that were not, suggest-
ing that additional tuning might improve results on these currently unrepaired
classes of bugs. One bug that was never repaired in our experiment involved an
“incorrect function call.” To repair this bug using our technique would require
finding the “correct” function elsewhere in the program with exactly the correct
parameters, while avoiding extraneous mutations that change behavior on re-
gression test cases. In this experiment, we focused on discovering the proactive
repair, and we leave for future work the problem of automatically deciding how
to resolve discrepancies that are discovered among selected variants, either with
an automated repair or by generating additional test cases.
We predict that the more latent bugs there are in a program, the more likely
it is that at least one of them will be repaired through proactive diversity. This
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Figure 6: Number of unique bugs repaired and number of unique variants re-
quired to repair at least one seeded bug as a function of number of bugs seeded
for the potion program. Starting with a population of 5,000 neutral program vari-
ants the total number of unique bugs repaired is shown in blue and the number of
neutral variants needed to find a repair for at least one seeded bug is shown in red.
The X-axis is the number of bugs seeded in the subject program (potion). The Pearson
correlation coefficient between the number bugs seeded and repaired is 0.95.
is relevant because most deployed programs have significantly more than five
outstanding defects (e.g., 18,165 from October 2001 to August 2005 and 2,013
open bug tickets May 2003 to August 2005 for Eclipse (V3.0) and Firefox (V1.0)
respectively [4]). To test this prediction, we seeded one of our test programs,
potion, with ten additional held-out defects. We then generate 5,000 neutral
variants which were selected to maximize the number the distinct positions in
the original program which they modify. Figure 6 plots the number of distinct
bugs repaired by these 5,000 variants as a function of the number of defects
seeded, yielding a correlation of 95%. If the linear relation shown in Figure
6 applies to the Eclipse and Firefox projects, a population of 5,000 program
variants could proactively repair as many as 9,000 and 1,000 latent bugs in
those systems, respectively.
We leave as future work the application of this technique to higher order
neutral mutants as constructed in Section 4.5. While such variants would also
greatly increase diversity they would be less useful in directly pinpointing the
source code implicated in buggy behavior.
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Although preliminary, these results show how the mutational robustness
properties of programs might be used to quickly repair programs or as in the
scenario outlined in the next subsection.
5.2 Neutral variants for N-version programming
In their classic work on independence in multiversion programming, Knight and
Leveson found that distinct teams of humans, when given an identical program-
ming task, produce solutions that have correlated errors (bugs) [48]. That is,
two independent teams are unlikely to produce two independent implementa-
tions, which decreases the potential benefit of N-person programming.
Previous work has shown that GP can serve as a promising tool for N-
version programming [19]. In particular, GP can automate the significant task
of developing N independent software instances. However, the technique had
limited applicability because it relied on de-novo programs evolved in simplified
languages specifically designed for GP.
The diverse populations of program variants described in this section could
serve as the bases for an N-version programming system. Such a system could
potentially address part of the non-independence hurdle because the mutations
are generated randomly rather than by people, producing independent algorith-
mic changes. For example, if we seed 15 bugs in potion and then select at
random ten neutral variants which each proactively repair one bug, we see that,
on average, 1.7 different defects are fixed by those ten proactive repairs, rather
than 1.0, which we would expect if they were 100% correlated.
To put this idea into perspective, for the first month after Firefox 4.0 was
released (March 11 through April 10, 2011), the project’s Bugzilla database
shows that an average of 77 new, non-duplicate bugs were reported per day.
Given that this rate of bug reporting is more than ten times the number of bugs
seeded in our evaluation, we conjecture that an N-version programming system
populated by our technique would be at least as effective in similar real-world
systems as it is in our experimental setup.
6 Discussion
The results presented here contradict the prevailing folk wisdom that software
is a precise and intentionally engineered mechanism, which is brittle to small
perturbations. We find software to be inherently robust to random mutations,
malleable within extensive neutral landscapes, and evolvable by combining the
mutation operators described here with crossover and selection [93, 51, 50].
This new view of software suggests a number of exciting areas for future work.
These include further analysis of the extent, origins and mechanics of software
mutational robustness, novel practical applications to software engineering, and
new parallels between software applications and evolved biological organisms.
We next discuss threats to the validity of our findings, and then explore each of
these three areas of future work in turn.
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6.1 Threats to Validity
The quantitative results that we report depend on the particular choice of mu-
tation operators, and a competent programmer could likely craft operators ca-
pable of achieving any pre-set desired level of mutational robustness. However,
we believe that the operators used in this paper are sufficiently simple, power-
ful and general that they expose software mutational robustness as an inherent
property of software. A topic left for future investigation is to define and test a
wider variety of mutation operators (including mutation operations taken from
the mutation testing community such as Mothra [44]), studying their effect on
software mutational robustness.
We use test suites to assess program behavior. Insufficient test suites could
artificially inflate our estimates of software mutational robustness. Multiple
aspects of our experimental design addresses this threat explicitly. In Section
4.1 we selected benchmarks programs with a wide variety of test-suite cover-
age and depth, including both the Siemens programs, whose test suites have
been developed by multiple independent researchers to achieve an exceptionally
high quality, and small sorting programs, where we can test all corner cases ex-
haustively. In Section 4.3 we analyze mutational robustness across these three
categories of programs, finding little variation in the average and minimal mu-
tational robustness measured for each category. As a further step to address
concerns about test-suite quality, in Section 4.4 we manually categorized neutral
variants for a small program, finding that at least 29 of the 35 analyzed variants
could not possibly fail any test suite that conforms to the program specification.
In Section 5 we demonstrate applications of software mutational robustness
to the tasks of software development and maintenance. This demonstration
does not address the impact which low-quality test suites may have on the
performance of our demonstrated applications. Such an investigation may be
required before such techniques are applied.
6.2 Further Investigation
Although we demonstrate the reach of neutral software landscapes in Section
4.5 by evolving neutral variants hundreds of edits removed from an original
program, much about these landscapes remains unknown. How densely do the
spaces of neutral variants fill the space of all possible programs? Are these
neutral spaces connected and traversable, or isolated? Do these spaces extend
to all portions of program space (as the neutral spaces of mappings of RNA
sequences to RNA structures do [75])?
Measuring the “distance” between neutral program variants may illuminate
the effective impact of neutral program mutations. Such distance metrics could
be based on information flow through the program during execution [82], or
comparison of stack traces or system calls [21].
Recent work has shown that Markov Chain Monte Carlo [3] (MCMC) tech-
niques are capable of traversing neutral program spaces defined by vastly smaller
programs on the order of 10 assembly instructions [71]. It remains unclear if
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these techniques are extensible to the spaces defined by full-size programs with
loops.
Software mutational robustness measures the density of neutral variants
within a single edit of a program. However, the density of higher-order neu-
tral variants remains unknown. We could possibly use MCMC to sample the
space of more neutral variants within a given edit radius or the original program
as follows:
1. Calculate the mixing time of an edit-radius constrained neutral variant
markkov chain;
2. Record the neutrality of program encountered after the mixing time;
3. Use mark and recapture techniques from population ecology [69] to esti-
mate the total volume of neutral variants.
Performing mark and recapture experiments within neutral landscapes found
along the post mixing time walks would allow us to estimate the absolute number
of neutral variants within a given edit radius of the original program.
This work does not address execution time software robustness. Examples
include: short error propagation distances observed in web servers studied in
failure oblivious computing [68], and calculations such as those prevalent in
the PARSEC benchmark suite [10], which iteratively converge on the correct
solutions and which may become more common as future applications leverage
multi-core architectures.
6.3 Applications to Software Engineering
There are an infinite number of possible implementations for any functional
program specification, and Table 1 can be interpreted as illustrating how easy it
is to find such multiple equivalent implementations. These results also suggest
that programs have a significant amount of unidentified and unexploited redun-
dancy. One practical implication of large traversable neutral landscapes would
be to search the neutral landscapes for regions that optimize non-functional
properties such as program size (as demonstrated in Figure 5b), memory re-
quirements, runtime, power consumption, or any other non-functional software
features. This may explain the success of previous work optimizing graphics
shader software [78].
The large neutral landscapes revealed by our study may also explain the suc-
cess of evolutionary methods, such as GP, on the task of automated program re-
pair [93]. Although this parallel with evolutionary biology is intriguing (Section
2.1), we do not yet have definitive evidence that quantifies the role of mutational
robustness in automated program repair, a topic that we leave for future work.
We suspect that other methods of automated repair (e.g., [15, 36, 91, 93, 66])
may ultimately be understood in the context of software mutational robustness
and evolvability.
In addition to the proactive diversity application described in Section 5, it
might be feasible to incorporate other machine learning methods into software
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development and maintenance processes; such methods typically work poorly
on brittle system and require some degree of robustness while they search for
improved solutions.
Our results constitute a fundamentally different interpretation of software
mutants than that of the mutation testing community. We do not view software
mutants as faulty or neutral mutants as an indicator of an insufficient test suite.
Instead we view software mutants as natural and neutral mutants as alternate
implementations of software specifications which admit many non-equivalent
implementations. The quick-sort example discussed in Section 1 demonstrates
that simple mutations can yield different fully correct implementations. Yin et
al. provide another example in which a fully-formally verified implementation
of AES encryption is changed based on what was “purely an implementation
decision, [where] the specification did not impose any restrictions,” yielding
another formally verified implementation [97, p.61].
Such alternate implementations, which may have distinct runtime properties
but still conform to the program specification, are neutral, but are not equiva-
lent in the sense used by the mutation testing community. The authors have
performed a thorough review of the mutation testing literature to compare our
empirical findings of software mutational robustness to typical frequencies of
equivalent mutants in the mutation testing paradigm. The mutation testing
community does identify equivalent mutants as one of the fundamental prob-
lems in mutation testing (cf. [35, Section II.C]). Although this problem is well
known, we were unable to find formal publications that experimentally identify
the fraction of equivalent mutants (aside from work explicitly targeting Object-
Oriented mutation operators which generate particularly high rates of equivalent
mutants [76, 72, 62]).
Through our own review of the mutation testing literature we collected un-
reported counts of equivalent mutants from a number of papers [23, 60, 59, 16]
that all used the Mothra [44] mutation operators and that found equivalent
mutant rates of 9.92%, 6.75%, 6.24% and 6.17% respectively. Although these
works used different mutation operators than those described in Section 3.2,
the percentages of equivalent mutants found are smaller than the percentage
of neutral mutants which we report, and are thus consistent with our results
because equivalent mutants are a strict subset of neutral mutants.
Our re-interpretation of software mutants opens the possibility of re-purposing
the many tools developed by the mutation testing community. For example,
runtime optimization techniques such as mutant scheme generation [83] enable
the compilation of “super mutants” capable of executing all first-order mutants
of a program. Such a system could potentially be applied to efficiently deploy
and run populations of diverse software variants as described in Section 5 on
end user systems. Techniques for the automatically identifying fully equivalent
mutants [59, 61] could be used to differentiate between those neutral mutants
that are identical to the original program and those that encode a distinct im-
plementation. These are just two examples of how the extensive toolbox of
mutation testing could be re-purposed to leverage the view of software mutants
as neutral.
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6.4 Comparison to Biological Mutational Robustness
Beyond the significance for computation, we believe that our results are relevant
to biologists. We considered the effect of repeated neutral mutations in a single
program, showing that robustness can increase systematically through popu-
lation exploration of the neutral landscape; a property shared with biological
systems [89]. We also showed that it is possible to generate programs that are
many mutational steps removed from the original while retaining functionality
(i.e., without leaving the neutral plateau). These large extended neutral land-
scapes are thought to be essential to the ability of biological systems to improve
through natural selection [75, 84] but difficult to measure experimentally. Our
software analogs may eventually provide a useful experimental framework for
testing hypotheses about the role of neutrality in biological evolution.
Currently, it is difficult to draw conclusions from a quantitative compari-
son of the 36.8% mutational robustness found in software to typical levels of
mutational robustness in biological systems (e.g, 30% mutational robustness in
hominids [18], or the almost 40% neutrality of gene knockouts (deletions) in
yeast [81]). There are many drivers of mutational robustness in biological sys-
tems; environmental stability influences levels of robustness [55], the centrality
of a gene may influence its mutational robustness [38], evolution may either
select for mutational robustness [84] or it may be more effective in organisms
that are mutationally robust [12]. There are analogs to each of these factors
in software systems, which future work may relate to the levels of mutational
robustness found in software.
Mutational robustness has many correlates in biological systems. These
include a correlation between environmental and mutational robustness [52, 45,
84] and a correlation between mutational robustness and evolvability [89]. The
presence of analogous correlations in software systems is an intriguing possibility
that could be investigated empirically. Such an investigation could indicate
whether these relations are general across complex mutationally robust systems
or are specific to biological systems. If such correlations do exist in software, they
could lead to new applications, such as methods of automated hardening which
automatically increase environmental robustness through increasing mutational
robustness (as in Section 4.5).
We may use the ratio between genome size and gene number as a proxy for
the relative mutational robustness of biological organisms, although this would
certainly be a lower bound. However this ratio varies widely from 97:47% in
prokaryotes and viruses, to 87:1% in eukaryotes. We note that those portions of
software that are executed by the test suite (e.g., where we limit our mutation
operations) could be compared to those portions of the genome that code for
genes. In both cases we can be sure that those portions have a phenotypic
effect, and in both cases we can’t say for sure that the uncovered or non-coding
portions have no effect. Such portions may either regulate expression or affect
compilation respectively. Direct software analogs of non-coding regulatory DNA
could include type annotations or pragmas.
Similarly, some of the causes of large genomes in biological organisms have
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immediate analogs in the would of software development. Gene duplication
is thought to be a significant contributor to the growth in genome size. The
analogous practice of copy-paste programming is a wide spread and common
software development technique [41, 39, 49, 37].
Ultimately software may stand with biological organisms as a second example
of an evolved system. Albeit one in which humans engineers are the mechanisms
of both mutation and selection [1].
7 Conclusion
The previous sections described experimental results, using three simple mu-
tation operators, which show that software is surprisingly robust to random
mutations. For the programs we tested, 37% of the mutations had no effect
on software functionality, as measured by the programs test suites. Software
mutational robustness, or neutrality, is observed even in programs that are is
completely correct according to their specifications. Just as neutrality is believed
to enhance evolvability in naturally evolving populations, so may software neu-
trality enable and explain the evolvability of software, either through automated
means (e.g., [93]) or by humans.
Software robustness is potentially useful for enhancing the resilience of soft-
ware systems. We demonstrate this idea by describing a method that increases
software diversity, automatically generating software variants that are immune
to as yet undiscovered bugs. The insights into software described here suggest
several opportunities for the Software Engineering community, including the
following: Creating system diversity, for example, to protect against security
exploits; incorporating machine learning methods into software development
and maintenance; improving program performance; or developing error-tolerant
computations.
We postulate that the presence of mutational robustness in software is not
an effect of intentional design, but is rather an effect of software’s provenance
through natural selection—even though the agents of selection, mutation and
reproduction are human engineers. In this way, mutational robustness can be
viewed as a property arising through inadvertent selection in both natural and
engineered systems. Further study of software as an evolved system may yield
new insights into those aspects of evolution that are specific to biological systems
and those which are general across other complex evolved, and even engineered,
systems. Because software is fundamentally easier to instrument and observe
than naturally occurring populations, studying software robustness may lead
in the future to an increased understanding of the role of neutrality in natural
evolution.
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